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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
This Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER) sponsored 
Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC) workshop was held 17-20 September 2018 on the campus of the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. The three and a half day experience allowed 
NPS students focused interaction with faculty, staff, fleet officers, and visiting engineers from Navy labs 
and industry. Featuring a keynote address by the Vice President of the Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU), Mr. Frank Kelly (USMC retired), the workshop culminated in a morning of final concept briefs and 
fruitful discussion regarding the role of unmanned systems in the future naval force. This workshop also 
directly supported the Secretary of the Navy’s (SECNAV) direction that CRUSER foster the development 
of actionable operational concepts for robotic and autonomous systems within naval warfare areas and 
work with our industry partners.   
The September 2018 workshop “Cross-Domain Operations” tasked participants to apply emerging 
technologies to shape the way we fight. Within a near future conflict in an urban littoral environment, 
concept generation teams were given a design challenge: How might advancements in autonomy, 
machine learning, manned-unmanned teaming, emergent technologies, and unmanned systems be 
employed to enhance cross-domain operations in highly contested environments to accomplish missions 
more effectively and/or with less risk? With embedded facilitators, teams had three days to meet that 
challenge, and presented their best concepts on the final morning of the workshop. 
This September 2018 WIC workshop included just over 80 active participants, observers and guests – the 
full participant pool representing nearly 30 different organizations. Half of the workshop participants 
were NPS students drawn from over a dozen curricula across the NPS campus. For this workshop, the 
final roster also included participants from The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (JHU/APL), 
the Naval War College (NWC), Battelle, L3 Technologies, and Lockheed Martin. Fleet commands included 
OPNAV N2N6FX, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) 
Newport, 12th Flying Training Wing, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) Systems 
Center (SSC) Pacific, Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division (NSWC PCD), U.S. Fleet Forces 
(USFF), the Office of Naval Research (ONR) the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), and the New Zealand 
Defence Force.  
Participants were asked to propose both physical designs and concepts of operation for notional future 
systems' employment in a plausible real-world scenario with the intent of advancing robotic and 
autonomous systems concepts. From all the concepts generated during the ideation phase, each team 
selected concepts to present in their final briefs. CRUSER and Warfare Innovation Continuum leadership 
reviewed all the proposed concepts and selected ideas with potential operational merit that aligned 
with available resources for further research and development. All concepts are described fully in this 
report, but in summary these concepts include: 
1) Counter UxS: this topic area includes concepts to counter attacks by adversary autonomous 
assets (real and virtual) in multiple domains envisioned in a future contested region. Examples 





Autonomous Sensor Persistence (WASP) – many smaller unmanned systems (UxS) blocking 
and/or attacking another UxS. 
2) Cross-Domain Connectivity: this topic area includes concepts to establish robust and resilient 
communication networks between autonomous manned and robotic assets operating across 
multiple domains simultaneously in a future contested environment assuming degraded or 
denied communications. Examples of specific concepts within this topic area include 
Underwater Disaggregated Architecture and C3PO for Machines – a universal translator. 
3) Human-Autonomy Teaming: this topic area includes concepts to integrate manned and 
unmanned assets working as an integrated force in a future battlespace. Examples of specific 
concepts within this topic area include Virtual Battlefield Sim and Third Eye – a human worn 
augmented data collector. 
4) Autonomy for Deception: this topic area includes concepts employing autonomy to spoof, 
decoy, or otherwise deceive future adversary forces, human and robotic. Examples of specific 
concepts within this topic area include Trash Camo, Bio Buoys and the Submarine Investigation, 
Revelation, and Exploitation Network (SIREN) - many UxS elements mimicking a high value unit. 
Selected concepts will begin CRUSER’s next Innovation Thread, and members of the CRUSER community 
of interest will be invited to further develop these concepts in response to the FY19 and FY20 Call for 
Proposals. Technical members of the CRUSER community of interest will present proposals at a technical 
continuum gathering such as TechCon 2019 to prototype and test concepts of interest in lab or field 
environments. A final report, the FY19 CRUSER Annual Report, detailing process and outcomes will be 
released before the end of the 2019 calendar year to a vetted distribution list of leadership and 








Sponsored by the OPNAV N91 Chair, Systems Engineering Analysis, and the Consortium for Robotics and 
Unmanned Systems (CRUSER), this Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC) workshop was held on campus 
during Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Thesis & Research Week, 17-20 September 2018. Tasked with 
developing concepts of operation (CONOPS) in a near future global scenario with simultaneous conflicts 
on several distinct fronts, participants generated and proposed technologies to support their CONOPS.    
A. ORIGINS                                                 
Innovation and concept generation are key drivers for CRUSER and other NPS research efforts, and these 
workshops are a central element of the overall strategic plan for the CRUSER program. The first NPS 
Innovation Seminar supported the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)-sponsored Leveraging the Undersea 
Environment war game in February 2009. Since that time, workshops have been requested by various 
sponsors to address self-propelled semi-submersibles, maritime irregular challenges, undersea weapons 
concepts and unmanned systems concepts generation. Participants in these workshops have included 
junior officers from NPS and the fleet; early career engineers from industry, U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) laboratories, and other Federal agencies; and officers from allied nations. 
One of CRUSER’s primary mandates is to develop a community of interest for unmanned systems 
education and research, and provide venues for communication. These workshops were also designed 
to maximize relationship building to strengthen the CRUSER community in the future. During 
Enrichment Week in September of 2012, the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) and 
CRUSER sponsored a concept generation workshop that was focused on advancing the Design for 
Undersea Warfare.1  The March 2013 workshop, Undersea Superiority 2050, took a more focused look 
at the undersea domain aspects of the September 2012 workshop outcomes. The September 2013 
workshop looked at distributed surface and air forces. The September 2014 workshop explored 
operations in contested littoral environments. The September 2015 workshop was designed to explore 
the concept of electromagnetic maneuver warfare, and tasked participants with employing unmanned 
systems in cross domain operations. Following the fleet interests, last year’s workshop focused on 
developing autonomy to strengthen Naval power in response to CNO Richardson’s release of the Design 
for Maintaining Maritime Superiority focusing document in January 2016. The September 2017 
workshop “Distributed Maritime Operations” tasked participants to apply emerging technologies within 
a near future conflict in an urban littoral environment. 
In the September 2018 WIC workshop focused on cross-domain operations (CDO) with the design 
challenge: How might advancements in autonomy, machine learning, manned-unmanned teaming, 
emergent technologies, and unmanned systems be employed to enhance cross-domain operations in 
highly contested environments to accomplish missions more effectively and/or with less risk?  With 
embedded facilitators, six concept generation teams had three days to meet that challenge, and 
                                                          






presented their best concepts at the end of the workshop. Participants from government, industry and 
academia worked this design challenge and presented over 20 unique concepts. Their work is the 
subject of this report. 
B. PLANNING AND EXECUTION                                          
Planning for this workshop began in earnest several months in advance of the event. CRUSER concept 
generation workshops are scheduled during the week between the end of classes and graduation in 
September or March each academic year to maximize the utility of NPS student time. NPS Thesis & 
Research Week, formerly Enrichment Week – a week without regularly scheduled classes – is intended 
to allow all NPS students to participate in an activity to further their intellectual growth in specialized 
areas of study. These concept generation workshops are an ideal fit for this mission. 
1. Workshop Participants                                        
Workshop participants were recruited from across the full CRUSER community of interest to include 
NPS, DoD commands, academia and industry. A concerted effort was made to solicit representatives 
from all naval warfare domains, as well as from the full range of armed services on campus.  
 
Figure 1. September 2018 Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC) workshop participants 
This September 2018 WIC workshop included just over 80 active participants, observers and guests – the 
full participant pool representing nearly 30 different organizations. Half of the workshop participants 
were NPS students drawn from over a dozen curricula across the NPS campus. For this workshop, the 
final roster also included participants from The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (JHU/APL), 
the Naval War College (NWC), Battelle, L3 Technologies, and Lockheed Martin. Fleet commands included 
OPNAV N2N6FX, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) 
Newport, 12th Flying Training Wing, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) Systems 
Center (SSC) Pacific, Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division (NSWC PCD), U.S. Fleet Forces 
(USFF), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), and the New Zealand 
Defence Force.  
The six concept generation teams were organized to maximize diversity of participant experience. Team 
workrooms provided individual workspaces while maintaining the ability of team members and 
facilitators to share many ideas at several stages in concept development. All participants were 





A group networking event was scheduled on the first night to enhance group dynamics, and prepare 
individuals to work efficiently in an intensive team environment. Senior members of CRUSER, NPS 
leadership and academic community, as well as visiting subject matter experts were invited to attend 
any and all of the workshop that fit their interest and schedule. All were encouraged to attend the final 
concept presentations on Thursday morning.  
2. Workshop Design                                                  
The September 2018 workshop, “Cross-Domain Operations,” leveraged the innovation lessons learned 
in previous workshops and was designed specifically to inspire innovative concept generation and 
development.  
Scenario 
All participants were given an overview of the future scenario titled “Global War 2030” focused on a 
future global conflict in multiple theaters. Derived from current open source media reports, this scenario 
reflects published thinking by current global military stakeholders. Teams were tasked with developing 
concepts of operations to counter multiple threats in a global warfare scenario but were not required to 
address the conflict in its entirety. A copy of their scenario is included at the end of this report (see 
Appendix B). 
Process 
The U.S. Navy (USN), and DoD writ large, have encouraged innovation at all levels and have pointed to 
Silicon Valley as an innovation exemplar. Product and software development based on user needs led 
Silicon Valley to become an innovation leader. These user-focused processes have evolved into what is 
now practiced as “Design Thinking” in industry, academia, and now the military. The WIC workshop 
employs tools of design for rapid and effective concept generation. 
With the help of embedded facilitators, the teams use these tools to address the given design challenge. 
User input is gleaned from a variety of subject matter experts, and senior military, academic, and 
industry leaders serving as mentors. Some of this input is given formally in the form of plenary briefs to 
assembled participants or as part of organized interviews, or informally throughout the workshop. This 
user input, as well as the assembled team’s experience in the given problem space is the data that 
begins their concept generation process. The second day of the workshop is focused on divergent 
creation of choices, and the third day begins by converging on concepts to fully describe for 
presentation. Summaries of these six team presentations are included at the end of this report (see 













II. CONCEPT SUMMARY  
Knowledge-leveling concept overviews and technology injects related to the design challenge started 
the exploration into the problem space. Stakeholder perspective statements also focused the concept 
generation work. Based on the plenary session guidance, read-ahead materials, and subject matter 
expert input, each team generated numerous concepts and then selected their best ideas to present in 
their final briefs. Following the final briefs on Thursday 20 September 2018, CRUSER and WIC leadership 
identified ideas with potential operational merit that aligned with available resources for broader 
dissemination within the CRUSER community of interest.  
A. Concepts and Technologies 
Several emerging concepts and technologies were introduced during the plenary sessions on the first 
three days of the workshop.2 Teams were encouraged to consider how these concepts and technology 
injects might benefit combined and allied forces in the scenario presented, but they were not required 
to include presented technologies in their final selected concepts. Plenary topics included: 
• Cross-Domain Operations (CDO)  
• Emerging technologies – military robotics and autonomy including FDECO and seabed cables 
• Seabed environment and geology 
• Undersea infrastructure defense 
• Fielding unmanned systems in multiple domains 
• Rapid concept generation and innovation 
• Moving from concept development to fielding – acquisitions  
The knowledge-leveling plenaries on Monday included an overview of Cross-Domain Operations (CDO) 
from a USFF perspective, a portfolio of emerging robotics and autonomy related technologies from a 
DoD lab and an industry perspective, and an introduction to elements of undersea infrastructure 
defense by a leading academic. Participants were also encouraged to look at the seabed as topography 
much as infantry might look at terrain – considering geologic features and other environmental and 
meteorological elements that might impact battlespace effectiveness. Tuesday and Wednesday morning 
each started with broader plenary talks before teams were released to their breakout rooms. The 
keynote address by the new Vice President of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), Mr. Frank 
Kelley, detailed his thoughts on how good ideas move through acquisitions to the field. Throughout the 
plenaries, speakers several examples of military approaches to innovation – some successful, some not – 
and lessons learned through past efforts.  
B. Concepts of Interest 
Key criteria used by the CRUSER selection committee to select concepts from all those proposed for 
further development were: 
                                                          





1) Is the concept feasible (physically, fiscally)?  
2) Is the concept unique? 
3) Is the concept testable? 
The following taxonomy of systems was developed from selected concepts presented by each team, as 
well as additional concepts submitted, but not developed. Identified categories of interest include: 
1) Counter UxS: this topic area includes concepts to counter attacks by adversary autonomous 
assets (real and virtual) in multiple domains envisioned in a future contested region. Examples 
of specific concepts within this topic area include Algorithm Capture and Weaponized 
Autonomous Sensor Persistence (WASP) – many smaller unmanned systems (UxS) blocking 
and/or attacking another UxS. 
2) Cross-Domain Connectivity: this topic area includes concepts to establish robust and resilient 
communication networks between autonomous manned and robotic assets operating across 
multiple domains simultaneously in a future contested environment assuming degraded or 
denied communications. Examples of specific concepts within this topic area include 
Underwater Disaggregated Architecture and C3PO for Machines – a universal translator. 
3) Human-Autonomy Teaming: this topic area includes concepts to integrate manned and 
unmanned assets working as an integrated force in a future battlespace. Examples of specific 
concepts within this topic area include Virtual Battlefield Sim and Third Eye – a human worn 
augmented data collector. 
4) Autonomy for Deception: this topic area includes concepts employing autonomy to spoof, 
decoy, or otherwise deceive future adversary forces, human and robotic. Examples of specific 
concepts within this topic area include Trash Camo, Bio Buoys and the Submarine Investigation, 
Revelation, and Exploitation Network (SIREN) - many UxS elements mimicking a high value unit. 







III. WAY AHEAD 
Of all the ideas generated through the facilitated design process, each team selected concepts to further 
explore and present in their final briefs. Following the final briefs on 20 September 2018, CRUSER 
leadership identified ideas with potential operational merit that aligned with available resources. In 
brief, identified concepts fell into four primary topic areas: 
1) Counter UxS: this topic area includes concepts to counter attacks by adversary autonomous 
assets (real and virtual) in multiple domains envisioned in a future contested region.  
2) Cross-Domain Connectivity: this topic area includes concepts to establish robust and resilient 
communication networks between autonomous manned and robotic assets operating across 
multiple domains simultaneously in a future contested environment assuming degraded or 
denied communications.  
3) Human-Autonomy Teaming: this topic area includes concepts to integrate manned and 
unmanned assets working as an integrated force in a future battlespace.  
4) Autonomy for Deception: this topic area includes concepts employing autonomy to spoof, 
decoy, or otherwise deceive future adversary forces, human and robotic.  
In addition to the concepts and technology proposals, the September 2018 workshop also supported 
other equally vital elements of CRUSER's charter: 1) the advancement of general unmanned systems 
knowledge among the participants; and 2) a greater appreciation for the technical viewpoints for 
officers, or the operational viewpoint for engineers. The information interchange and relationship 
building that occurred during this event were characteristic of the workshop venue, and support 
CRUSER’s overall intent. 
A. Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC) 
The Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC) encompasses the successful research, education, and 
experimentation efforts, which are currently ongoing at NPS and across the naval enterprise. The goal of 
the continuum is to align regularly scheduled class projects, integrated research and special campus 
events into a broad set of coordinated activities that will help provide insight into the opportunities for 
future naval operations, fleet architectures, and fleet design. Exploring a new topic area each fiscal year, 
the WIC is a coordinated effort to execute a series of cross-campus educational and research activities 
that share a central theme. Classes, workshops and research projects are synchronized to leverage and 






Figure 2. FY18-19 NPS Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC). 
The WIC consists of a series of coordinated cross-campus educational and research activities with a 
central theme.  By incorporating topics of fleet interest into established academic courses and by 
supporting student thesis project research, students and faculty promote research that aligns with fleet 
priorities while simultaneously achieving the educational requirements for the graduate students. The 
FY18-19 WIC, “Cross-Domain Operations” (see Figure 2), address the question, “How might emerging 
technologies enhance cross-domain operations?” Final reports are available for all prior continuums 







B. CRUSER Innovation Thread 
 
Figure 3. CRUSER Innovation Thread structure. 
CRUSER organizes activities around a programmatic Innovation Thread structure (see Figure 3) in parallel 
with the Warfare Innovation Continuum thread. Each innovation thread starts with a concept 
generation workshop traditionally in September each year. Concepts of merit are identified, and 
technical members of the CRUSER community of interest are asked to submit proposals on how these 
concepts might actually work. Proposals are presented at an annual Technical Continuum (TechCon) or 
demonstrated at the annual NPS CRUSER research fair, and then several are selected to take to field 
experimentation. Finally, results of field experimentation are presented to CRUSER sponsors and other 
community of interest members. 
Since 2011 CRUSER has made progress along seven innovation threads (see Figure 4). The first six 
Innovations Threads are complete, the seventh thread is underway, and Innovation Thread #8 started 













APPENDIX A: Final Concepts 
Five teams presented their final briefs on Thursday 20 September 2018, and were each given 15 minutes 
to present their most developed and promising concepts. The following concept summaries detail these 
final presentations. The team working the challenge at the classified level presented on Wednesday 
afternoon. A truncated, unclassified summary of the concepts they generated is included in this report. 
A. Team Ursula 
 
Figure 5. Members of Team Ursula included (pictured from left to right) LT John Hawley USN, LCDR Jonathan Durham USN, 
Dr. Kristen Collar, Maj Christopher Phifer USMC, Trevor Tallos, LT Scott Constantine USN, Kerri Williams, Jeremy O’Neal, and 
ENS Kylie Bradley USN. 
 
The members of this team (see Figure 5 and Table 1) included five junior and mid-level officers from 
both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps, three early career engineers, one NPS faculty member, and 
three NPS students. 
Table 1. Members of Team Ursula (alphabetical by last name) 
NAME PERSPECTIVE AFFILIATION 
ENS Kylie Bradley USN Undersea warfare NPS Undersea Warfare 
Dr. Kristen Collar Electrical engineer JHU/APL 
LT Scott Constantine USN Air warfare NPS Systems Engineering Analysis 
LCDR Jonathan Durham USN IP officer OPNAV N2N6D 
LT John Hawely USN Facilitator  USFF 
Jeremy O’Neal Systems engineer L3 Technologies 
Maj Christopher Phifer USMC Expeditionary warfare NPS Physics 
Trevor Tallos Electrical engineer Battelle 






Team Ursula presented their final generated concepts on Thursday morning, adding “Team PAC-MAN” 
as their alternate team name to better reflect their ideas. Their problem statement was: How might we 
share and enhance knowledge cross-domain? The team identified an issue across the DoD where from 
branch to branch of the armed services, and from subsea all the up to space, operators do not get all the 
available information they need to complete their missions most efficiently and effectively. The team 
worked from this starting point to generate concepts to critically and tactically move necessary 
information quickly to those who need it – “one piece of the puzzle all the way across to the other piece 
of the puzzle.” As they begin their work, the team assumed that our future force would have in place 
robust cyberspace policies governing this emerging domain, and enhanced and sustainable power 
capabilities to ensure endurance of operations. The team also assumed a future with enhanced data 
replication techniques and available local communications. 
A team member shared anecdotally their experience working across military branches as being without 
exception hampered by non-integrated communications equipment, access, and protocols. The team 
envisioned one system where all operators regardless of branch of service could access the information 
they required, and communicate with any other team member to help them make the best decision 
with the best collection of information available. The team imaged future warfighters logging into this 
one network in preparation for a future operation to gain access to all pertinent information – not just 
information generated or posted by their own military branch – about their area of operation (AOR). 
After action reports from previous similar operations, equipment available, and situation reports 
(SITREPS) for the AOR would all be readily available and not because you “pounded on your intel guy to 
find out what was going on.” Once your unit is deployed to the AOR, this one network would not only 
allow your unit to locate equipment and sensors, but would allow you to interact with all these assets 
seamlessly in real time. Right now sensors are branch specific – “as a Marine I can’t pull information 
from an Army sensor.” One network would allow for quicker informed decision making “to do our job 
better”, allow branches to learn from each other, and better understand the adversary through 
integrated information gathering.  
1. Joint Information Filtration System (JIFS) 
Recognizing this communication obstacle, Team Ursula proposed the Joint Information Filtration System 
(JIFS). This system will connect across services and cross-domain to help mitigate the current stove 
piped information sharing obstacles. JIFS would allow a future commander to see what sensors are in 
the field, and to access information in real time to enhance situational awareness. The user would 
experience a coordinated data feed that is customized to meet their unit needs, not an unwieldy flood 
of all available data feeds. This orchestrated effort would pull required data and suggest optional data to 
be accessed upon user discretion, informing our military, improving communications, and enhancing 
situational awareness. The team gave a Google Maps like example (see Figure 6) showing available 
sensors in a fictional AOR. With one click the user could access the asset point of contact, exact location, 
mission, and availability. Beyond this active pull feature, AOR data would also be pushed alerting a user 
if a nearby sensor is triggered with information pertinent to their unique mission. It is then up to the 






Figure 6. Joint Information Filtration System (JIFS) envisioned graphical user interface (GUI).3 
This network should incorporate non-traditional sensor feeds as well, such as data collected by sensor 
assets operated by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), academic 
experiments, as well as information collected by our allies. Eventually, JIFS would provide command and 
control (C2) guidance, and would also log meta-data to increase confidence intervals facilitating the use 
of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms to improve a unit’s battlespace effectiveness and protect human 
warfighters. 
2. C3PO for Machines – Universal Translator 
JIFS will assist warfighters by enhancing situational awareness giving commanders more engagement 
options. Current communications architecture interrupted by organizationally driven stove piping does 
not allow for the seamless mesh network required to support JIFS. To mitigate this obstacle, Team 
Ursula proposed a “protocol droid for machines” – or a universal translator. In response to a search, JIFS 
will identify sensors already in an AOR. If the data set available is outdated JIFS would make the unit 
aware of the issue and suggest using an available asset of opportunity such as a nearby unmanned 
underwater vehicle (UUV) swarm to collect new data to reflect current conditions. Once the commander 
accepts the suggestion, JIFS – using this universal translator – sends the swarm to collect the required 
data relieving the commander of the logistics and planning burden. When a helicopter pilot is assigned 
to provide a protective screen for a carrier, searching for enemy submarines. Knowing the sound 
velocity profile of the AOR is essential for mission success. Currently, we physically deploy a mission 
specific BT buoy. JIFS would allow the helicopter pilot to quickly identify pre-deployed assets to provide 
the required preparation data, rather than using valuable time and resources to deploy an additional 
asset. Marines preparing for a beach landing might review satellite images of the terrain without any 
assurance that the imagery is current. A request sent through the universal translator for real time 
beach imagery would allow JIFS to deliver much more useful preparation for the Marine unit. 
                                                          






3. JIFS CONOPS  
JIFS will give the warfighter the information they ask for, and based on the operator requests JIFS will 
also suggest information that may be useful – allowing commanders to make more informed decisions 
more rapidly – “better, faster, safer.” CNO Richardson4  has encouraged use of all technological tools 
available to tighten up our OODA loop.5 JIFS will speed up the observe, orient, and decide phases of that 
loop. In a future battlespace spanning from subsea all the way to space, JIFS will help close network 
loops across domains and across diverse assets. There is more sensor data available than human 
operators are able to use effectively on their own. JIFS will maximize the utility of the data available in 
any future AOR. Future AI integrated into JIFS will play a central role, augmenting the efforts of a human 
operator in a timely manner.  
 
Figure 7. Ad hoc mesh network of autonomous nodes working in tandem with human operators (command and control (C2) 
cell continental U.S. at right) providing real-time analyzed data to commanders in the field.6 
Currently, our networks communicate vertically rather than across services and domains, and are 
heavily dependent for functionality on human operators. A future envisioned by the Defense Advance 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and others will rely on ad hoc networks between autonomous nodes 
with a heavy reliance on AI for functionality. Team Ursula suggested staring in the middle of that range, 
focusing on ad hoc networking with autonomous nodes working in tandem with human operators 
incorporating emerging AI for functionality (see Figure 7). This allows for nimble adjustments based on 
warfighter stated and perceived needs and battlespace conditions, but does not push us past what is 
envisioned by 2030 in AI. This will allow engineers time to address initial questions such as: What fiber 
                                                          
4 CNO Richardson remarks, CSIS 25 May 2017 last accessed 8 OCT 2018 at https://www.csis.org/analysis/remarks-
cno-adm-richardson  
5 The cycle of “observe, orient, decide, and act” developed by military strategist and United States Air Force Colonel 
John Boyd. 
6 Dr. Tim Grayson, Director DARPA STO “Mosaic Warfare” 27 July 2018. Source: 





protection do we need for undersea communications cables? What technologies will we need to bridge 
the sea-air interface, or for effective underwater-to-underwater communications?  There are currently 
significant limitations that we need to overcome to get to the point where this sort of ad hoc networking 
is possible. 
 
Figure 8. Schematic of acoustic wave-, microwave-, blue LED-, and blue LD-based underwater communications.7  
Recognizing the significant challenges associated with undersea communications, the team suggested 
that mitigating current obstacles in underwater-to-underwater networking and communications should 
be the first step to develop JIFS (see Figure 8). Underwater-to-air networking and communications will 
be the next interface to address. Pre-staged optics, such as Blue lasers, may create many new 
opportunities for underwater communications. A disaggregated network architecture – specifically 
disaggregated data, such as cloud-based data storage (see Figure 9) – will still allow for locally stored 
data, but will also allow these data sets to inform decisions of the entire force.  
                                                          
7 Tsai-Chen Wu, Yu-Chieh Chi, Huai-Yung Wang, Cheng-Ting Tsai & Gong-Ru Lin “Blue Laser Diode Enables 
Underwater Communication at 12.4 Gbps” SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 7:40480 | DOI: 10.1038/srep40480, 17 January 






Figure 9. Disaggregation network architecture enables flexible and composable computing while relieving the system of a 
single point of failure .8 
Team Ursula proposed that JIFS represents a $2M initial development investment, and a startup effort 
could involve a minimal unmanned vehicle (UxV) swarm of three UUVs, four unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), and two unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) focusing on effective situational awareness in an 
undersea AOR. This mixed asset swarm would use limited AI-enabled push/pull information sharing over 
a self-forming and self-healing network with a disaggregated architecture seamlessly integrating in situ 
sensors. The team proposed testing JIFS in the NPS Sea, Land, Air Military Research (SLAMR) facility in 
2020 on a kill chain mission. 
 
                                                          
8 Graphic source: Anand Haridass, Chief Engineer IBM Development for Inspur Power Commercial Systems “The 
Cloud & Its Impact on IT” Invited Talk, IEEE Electrical Design of Advanced Packaging and Systems (EDAPS) posted 9 





B. Team Proteus 
 
Figure 10. Members of Team Proteus included (pictured from left to right) LCDR Chris O’Connor USN, LCDR Matthew Larkin 
USN, Ryan Cummiskey, ENS Austin Douglas USN, Michael LaBarre, Peng Zhang, Capt Benjamin Miles USMC, LCDR James 
Gowling RAN, and LT Jared Asmus USN. 
 
The members of this team (see Figure 10 and Table 2) included six junior and mid-level officers from the 
U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), three early career engineers, one 
foreign officer, one NPS military faculty member, and three NPS students. 
Table 2. Members of Team Proteus (alphabetical by last name) 
NAME PERSPECTIVE AFFILIATION 
LT Jared Asmus USN Surface warfare NPS Systems Engineering Analysis 
Ryan Cummiskey Mechanical engineer LMCO 
ENS Austin Douglas USN Undersea warfare NPS Undersea Warfare 
LCDR James Gowling RAN Information warfare Royal Australian Navy 
Michael LaBarre Engineer, ISR JHU/APL 
LCDR Mathew Larkin USN Facilitator NPS Business School 
Capt Benjamin Miles USMC Tank officer NPS Physics 
LCDR Chris O’Connor USN Facilitator USFF 
Peng Zhang Electrical engineer SSC- PAC 
 
Team Proteus named their concept Ready Player 2 and first presented two primary components – cyber 





1. Virtual Battlefield 
Borrowing from the StarCraft9 gaming world, Team Proteus presented a hierarchical virtual battlefield 
(see Figure 11) giving operators a common operating picture (COP). This virtual COP with the ability to 
update sensors and asset locations in real time using iridium and satellite communications (SATCOM) 
would display the “big picture” as well as important granularity for mission essential data sets. 
Operators could also select assets or units to display specific information, and could then select units 
and move them to different locations within the AOR – the unit would respond autonomously, and idle 
units could then be tasked to explore an area of interest. 
 
Figure 11. Virtual battlefield graphical user interface (GUI). 
The proposed interface is “completely software” – there is no hardware requirement. The AI platforms 
all use open source software such as Open AI Gym10 and TensorFlow™.11 All the collected data is 
valuable to create rigorous training for machine learning algorithms based on actual activity in real and 
tangible environments. This proposed virtual battlespace environment is based on two primary 
assumptions: 1) that the future cyber domain would be safe, and 2) 95% of users would have on-
demand access to the COP to both inform decisions and communicate orders.  
                                                          
9 “On March 31, 1998, Blizzard Entertainment released StarCraft, a revolutionary real-time strategy game pitting 
three powerful and distinctive races against each other in a war-torn galaxy. In StarCraft, the resourceful terrans, 
mysterious protoss, and relentless zerg find themselves in a confluence of events that has only one possible 
outcome: an epic war for conquest and survival.” Source: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20080402134120/http://www.blizzard.com/us/press/10-years-starcraft.html  
10 Gym is a toolkit for developing and comparing reinforcement learning algorithms. It supports teaching agents 
everything from walking to playing games like Pong or Pinball. Source: https://gym.openai.com/  
11 TensorFlow™ is an open source software library for high performance numerical computation. Its flexible 
architecture allows easy deployment of computation across a variety of platforms (CPUs, GPUs, TPUs), and from 
desktops to clusters of servers to mobile and edge devices. Originally developed by researchers and engineers from 
the Google Brain team within Google’s AI organization, it comes with strong support for machine learning and deep 






Data and time consolidation is a key element in this virtual battlespace. All the units and sensors in the 
environment are being updated in real time to provide operators the most recent information available 
to inform decisions. Not only is all this information being transmitted, but it is also being logged. This 
allows an operator to use a time scale slider to review past activity, and then scroll to the future for a 
prediction based on machine learning algorithms or a predicted future location of an individual 
unmanned asset or swarm operating autonomously. This time slider is a key discriminator in that it 
intuitively bridges the gap between human users and artificial intelligence. It leverages the power of AI 
in a display so simple a child could understand it (think weather radar past/future animation). The 
default view would be a simple clear picture, but the operator could add complexity by clicking on a unit 
for more complete information or on an enemy asset to view metadata about that asset. Users could 
draw radii of interest to receive information relevant to their operations while filtering away chaff 
outside their area of regard. ]. Finally, this concept is seamlessly scalable. The same tool will inform the 
decisions of a combatant command (COCOM)12 commander as well as an individual drone pilot – same 
platform, but tailored interface to meet the user’s needs. 
2. Weaponized Autonomous Sensor Persistence (WASP) 
 
Figure 12. Weaponized autonomous sensor persistence (WASP) concept. 
The team named their physical component the Weaponized Autonomous Sensor Persistence (WASP), a 
prepositioned swarm-of-swarms of low-observable weaponized sensors prepositioned in multiple 
domains (see Figure 12). Depending upon where each individual swarm is operating – the seafloor to 
                                                          
12 The Defense Department has 10 combatant commands, each with a geographic or functional mission that 
provides command and control of military forces in peace and war. Source: https://www.defense.gov/know-your-





space – WASP will leverage varied technologies to remain camouflaged. For instance, aerial assets could 
be made of radar absorbent materials and employ other stealth technologies. Assets operating in the 
water column could be designed to mimic marine life or blend in with the seafloor itself if deployed 
primarily in the benthic domain. WASP will operate across all domains, and swarm technology will help 
mitigate the overhead associated with commanding numerous payload-carrying assets individually. 
Once prepositioned, WASP will wait to be triggered. When it detects a triggering action it will report 
through the Ready Player 2 system what it has detected and through what kind of sensor such as an 
electro-optical trigger, a pressure change in the water column, or an electromagnetic anomaly. The 
human operator will then make the decision to act or ignore. If the operator decides to engage, WASP 
will conduct and consummate an engagement using the combination of assets with the highest 
probability to accomplish the assigned mission – resulting in better targetability and higher mission 
success. For instance, if the operator decides to go for mission kill on adversary war ship, WASP could 
target the weapon systems or target the sensors themselves – whatever is determined to provide the 
highest probability of mission kill. In the future contested theater assets will need to remain passive to 
avoid being targeted and killed by enemy sensors and weapon systems. WASPs will appear dormant, 
passively sensing acquiring situational awareness and will autonomously decide when that knowledge is 
worth transmitting back to the COP. 
3. Ready Player 2 CONOPS 
To further describe Ready Player 2, Team Proteus described three potential CONOPS. 
Cross-Domain Assets 
Imagine we have a large displacement UUV (LDUUV) prepositioned on the seafloor, and Ready Player 2 
detects and an enemy UAV threat inbound that could threaten an allied seabed pipeline. Using Ready 
Player 2, an operator could activate the LDUUV to deploy with a nearby swarm of Aquabotix 
SwarmDivers13 or any small UUV that the LDUUV could reposition in close proximity to the targeted 
pipeline for protection. The operator could then decide to airdrop something like DARPA’s Ocean of 
Things – tens of thousands of inexpensive buoys scattered across the surface of the targeted area to 
serve as sensors and communication repeaters using iridium phones. Balloons could also be deployed to 
serve as repeaters, closing the detection loop. Through Ready Player 2 the human operator could 
confirm a valid contact and authorize prosecution of that target through an order sent down through 
the “Oceans of Things”14 buoy array to the UUVs on the bottom – “swarm and kill that contact.” 
Murmuration 
Swarms in the battlespace are not new. However, Ready Player 2 uses hard-to-detect swarms 
prepositioned across multiple domains and reconfigurable for multiple missions based on common 
building blocks. “Laying in Wait” may be one common disposition, waiting to strike while passively 
sensing. Another building block disposition might be communications related, autonomously forming ad 
                                                          
13 Reference: http://www.aquabotix.com/ last accessed 16 October 2018 
14 DARPA Ocean of Things Aims to Expand Maritime Awareness across Open Seas: DARPA envisions ocean-based 
“internet of things” made of small, low-cost floating sensors. 6 DEC 2017 Source: https://www.darpa.mil/news-





hoc networks when the system identifies a need to transmit data in an emission controlled (EMCON) 
operational environment or otherwise communications degraded environment. A current challenge in 
ad hoc mesh networking is the immense amount of data bandwidth required to transmit with a huge 
number of nodes. Team Proteus proposed mitigating this challenge using a Starling murmuration15 
technique where emergent group behavior results from a simple group goal – so each individual 
member of the group only needs to communicate with its closest neighbors, not the entire group or 
back to a command node. This method would allow Ready Player 2 to scale to an enormous number of 
nodes without maxing out available bandwidth, and prevent the enemy from gaining an advantage 
through sheer numbers by flooding the battlespace with our own assets.  
Ready Player 2 will remain scalable in the future by incorporating new payloads in response to 
unforeseen future threats. Imagine payloads such as radio frequency (RF) jamming and launching chaff 
replaced in the future by payloads and techniques to defend against directed energy attacks on high 
value units. Aerial swarms might create a large cloud of smoke to physically attenuate the directed 
energy signal before it could damage a ship. 
Cyber Sold 
If a hard kill is not appropriate in a particular phase of the conflict, the team proposed a cyber-
alternative. Using autonomy for deception and manipulation, their CONOPS Cyber Sold forces the enemy 
to take an action of our choosing. Delivering convincing misinformation about their own system is one 
proposed option. Initially, a cyber-payload or effect designed to simulate a critical situation requiring 
immediate action would attack an identified vulnerability in enemy sensors, safety systems, or 
networks. In a situation where we create coordinated sensor readings that indicate trouble across an 
implausibly large field may raise enemy suspicions of a cyber-attack, so it is important to scope and 
target any efforts. To make this cyber CONOPS effective, it is also important to coordinate Cyber Sold 
with a physical effect such as swarming UxVs that look convincing enough to have carried out the attack 
simulated by the cyber payload. Cyber Sold is asymmetric because the autonomous vehicles do not need 
to be especially “smart” as they do not actually carry out the attack, but only need to operate with 
convincing complexity. Effects are also reversible which introduces plausible deniability and increases 
uncertainty for the enemy, giving our forces an advantage.  
                                                          
15 Murmuration refers to the phenomenon that results when hundreds, sometimes thousands, of starlings fly in 







Figure 13. Cyber Sold, a concept to deliver tactical cyber effects. 
Cyber Sold could be a force multiplier by simulating a military effect, or simulate a natural disaster or 
random failure. This cyber package could also simulate a non-attributable rouge attack. Non-attribution 
could be key in any future conflict, introducing just enough uncertainty to gain advantage. A low-
input/high-output infrastructure attack in the littoral area such as an offshore oilrig (see Figure 13) could 
be executed in a two pronged coupled cyber and physical manner starting with a cyber package 
introducing a series of false positive critical alert readings such as chemical imbalances or flowrate 
issues. These alerts coupled with a visible unmanned asset loitering near the platforms may interrupt 
enemy operational tempo and slow their decision making cycle as they determine the source of the 
perceived malfunction or non-attributed attack. Introducing controlled confusion in military and non-
military realms may result in a forced shutdown of critical enemy infrastructure while they investigate 






C. Team Grindylow 
 
Figure 14. Members of Team Grindylow included (pictured from left to right) LT Derek Bergren USNR, Dr. William Elmer VI, 
CAPT Tony Nelipovich USNR, Stephen O’Grady, Capt Kyle Rainwaters USAF, LT Nick Morgan USN, ENS Christian Sorenson 
USN, David Swedberg, and LCDR Santhosh Shivashankar USN. 
 
The members of this team (see Figure 14 and Table 3) included five junior and mid-level officers from 
both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force, three visiting engineers, a representative from the Department of 
Energy, two U.S. Navy reservists, and three NPS students. 
Table 3. Members of Team Grindylow (alphabetical by last name) 
NAME PERSPECTIVE AFFILIATION 
LT David Bergren USNR Submarine Warfare ONR 
Dr. William Elmer VI Civil engineer LLNL Department of Energy 
LT John “Nick” Morgan USN Surface warfare NPS Systems Engineering Analysis 
CAPT Tony Nelipovich USNR Facilitator ONR 
Stephen O’Grady Facilitator NUWC Newport 
Capt Kyle Rainwaters USAF Air warfare 12th OSS  
LCDR Santhosh Shivashankar USN Information Warfare NPS Computer Science 
ENS Christian Sorenson USN Undersea warfare NPS Undersea Warfare 
David Swedberg Mechanical engineer NSWC Panama City 
 
Team Grindylow presented a concept they titled DECEPTICON, a semi-autonomous battlefield creation 
through deception and lethality optimization. Assuming that the conflict zone is the enemy’s backyard, 
they will start to have uncontested control in every domain. With technologies available today we can 
deceive and defeat the enemy of tomorrow in which autonomous unmanned systems will dominate the 
battlefield. 
As presented in the scenario, China has home field advantage. They have their naval fleet, the mainland, 





intelligence (SIGINT), as well as over-the-horizon (OTH) capabilities in the AOR. The problem addressed 
was that U.S. Forces are outnumbered and their general position is known when operating around 
mainland China and the island chains. The solution proposed was to prepare the battlefield and confuse 
the enemy in their own backyard – deceive, disrupt, and destroy enemy intel, communication, 
detection, and combat capabilities by desensitizing enemy forces with the presence and pre-positioning 
of autonomous vehicles. 
The team proposed a five-element arsenal of autonomous assets as elements of military deception 
(MILDEC):  
1) Saildrone Deception Fleet 
2) Seabed Crawler Distractor 
3) LDUUV SSN Decoy  
4) Trash Cover 
5) Dense Swarms for Collaborative Lethality 
 
 
Figure 15. Key autonomous MILDEC elements of DECEPTICON. 
Deployed together in a cross-domain CONOPS and powered by seabed quantum computing, these 
elements working in tandem make up their full concept titled DECEPTICON (see Figure 15). Facing an 
adversary with sizable forces in their own backyard with extensive surveillance capability will require 
employment of an offset strategy. DECEPTICON will exploit the battlespace, leveraging environmental 
elements as camouflage to distract the enemy from realizing actual intent, and employ existing and 
emerging technologies in integrative new ways – across the domains of air, surface, subsurface, and the 
seabed. DECEPTICON will also employ disruptive technology to optimize strike capability, use SIGINT to 
manipulate enemy attention, and force them to expend resources sorting and filtering inputs to 
determine what is real and chasing false signals. The cross-domain elements of DECEPTICON working 





1. Saildrone Deception Fleet 
 
Figure 16. Saildrones deployed by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 30 June 2018.16 
An example of available technology to deceive and desensitize the enemy is the saildrone (see Figure 
16). Prepositioning saildrones or other USVs as weather collection craft will desensitize the enemy as 
they will be used to the presence of these seemingly innocent assets in international waters near their 
mainland. These assets would sit dormant until activated for SIGINT collection and transmission. 
Equipped with radio frequency (RF) transmitters to mimic carrier strike groups or other vessel 
transmissions to deceive enemy in a future conflict, these assets could conceal the movements of high 
value assets or create a distraction in the AOR forcing the adversary to commit resources – sending a 
ship or tasking a satellite – to investigate erroneous signals. 
2. Seabed Crawler Distractor 
Another proposal to distract the enemy and force them to divert resources is to deploy a seabed crawler 
(see Figure 17). This unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) designed for benthic transit could attract enemy 
attention through very noisy transit or perceptible interaction with underwater infrastructure leading 
the enemy believe we are conducting seabed operations (drilling, cutting, or placing assets on the 
seabed) – ultimately forcing the enemy to commit resources to investigate this seabed disruption.  
                                                          
16 Pictured: Four saildrones launched from Dutch Harbor, Alaska on30 June 2018, intended to make their way 
northward, surveying more than 20,000 miles, through Bering Strait and beyond, to measure carbon dioxide and 







Figure 17. Seabed crawler as tested by the ¡VAMOS! Consortium, October 2017. 17 
3. LDUUV SSN Decoy 
Using UUVs to deceive enemy forces, forcing them to employ assets to verify and destroy possible 
submarine subsurface assets, the team proposed a large displacement UUV (LDUUV) with a dummy 
periscope capable of mimicking a U.S. nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) periscope (see Figure 
18).  
 
Figure 18. LDUUV with a false periscope and other SSN features deployed as a decoy. 
This LDUUV would emit active tonals to mimic known US and allied submarines, and the visual mimicry 
element type 18 scope would emit RF and HF spectrum signals as the enemy might expect from an SSN.  
                                                          
17 On the 24th of October 2017 the ¡VAMOS! consortium, Advisory Board Members, and interested external 
parties were invited for a live demonstration of the ¡VAMOS! technology at the Imerys Minerals Ltd. test site in Lee 





4. Trash Cover 
Once the enemy detects our unmanned assets in their AOR they will likely launch a counter effort to 
locate and disable our assets. To protect the DECEPTICON MILDEC arsenal, the team proposed artificial 
floating trash (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19. Proposed "trash cover" element. 
If the enemy cannot find our MILDEC assets they cannot disable them. Leveraging a floating raft of 
plastic trash, DECEPTICON assets could hide in plain sight using the trash as cover. These artificial rafts of 
trash could also emit decoy signals on a random timer, further confusing the enemy and forcing them to 
commit more resources to investigate suspect signals. When the enemy got close to the suspect signal 
all they would see would be trash – an unfortunate but common element in most ocean environments – 
that they would likely ignore and continue their search for the signal source, or abandon the effort. The 
unmanned assets themselves could also be embedded in the artificial trash raft. 
5. Dense Swarms for Collaborative Lethality 
A final element of the autonomous cross-domain MILDEC arsenal would be a swarm of heterogeneous 
UxVs in multiple domains operating in swarms to distract, disorient, degrade and destroy the enemy. 
These dense lethality-capable swarms leveraging payloads such as directed energy weapons would only 
be deployed once the conflict reached the kinetic phase – a shooting war requiring kinetic effects. 
However, operating a large swarm requires individual tasking of each individual asset on the battlefield 
– which is currently quite human resource intensive. More weapons and operators usually results in a 
bigger gap between outcome and an optimal solution. Fulfilling commander’s intent while optimizing 
tasking outcome – not leaving unprosecuted targets while avoiding over-kill – requires a new way of 
operating in a future battlefield.  
A networked solution requires too much communication to be effective. To achieve effective distributed 
lethality in a future battlefield requires precise delivery of smaller warheads within microseconds of one 
another. The team approached this like a “Traveling Salesman” problem of cross-domain lethal effects, 
and looked at the United Parcel Service (UPS) for a solution. A UPS driver may have 25 packages in their 
truck, and we rely on human intuition to choose the best option of the 15 trillion, trillion delivery 
options. Driving one mile less saves UPS $30 million a year. If UPS purchases $30 million worth of time 





20 megawatts of computing power18 that they could now use to autonomously optimize their delivery 
routing. To access this sort of computing power in a future battlespace to optimize collaborative 
lethality of dense swarms the team proposed a combination of two existing technologies – an 
underwater data center using quantum computing (see Figure 20).  
 
Figure 20. Seabed quantum computing center. 
A quantum computer could solve the dense cross-domain swarm tasking optimization swarm problem 
with only 10 kilowatts of power, however it produces a lot of heat while doing so. Microsoft has placed a 
data center on the seabed in the North Sea allowing the naturally cold ocean waters to carry away heat 
leaving the technology functioning at an operationally sound temperature. Placing a quantum computer 
on the seabed in the AOR would solve the optimization and heat problems. Batteries could power this 
proposed seabed quantum computing center for several days, and could be replenished by the same 
UUVs that masked the initial delivery of the seabed computing asset which is envisioned as either a 
CONEX19 style container or designed to look like a natural seabed element such as a volcanic seamount 
or large rock. The LDUUV might also be an ideal resupply vehicle, and the seabed quantum computer 
could leverage the trash covers as communications nodes. Complete internal processing means that the 
quantum computing center would not impact the communications network traffic while calculating all 
possible options for optimization. 
Once placed the seabed quantum computing center would run “dark” only responding when “pinged” to 
deploy antenna to the surface with trash disguise. The Commander would then feed battlespace 
awareness inputs such as the costs and benefits associated with different assets, order of battle, 
Commanders intent, and the locations and capabilities of all assets in the AOR – allied and enemy, as 
well as the ideal end state. Using these inputs, the seabed quantum process would go dark again to 
compute optimal cross-domain swarm tasking, and when complete would go live again to transmit a 
                                                          
18 A tenth of what a U.S. aircraft carrier generates 
19 In 1948 the U.S. Army Transportation Corps developed the "Transporter", a rigid, corrugated steel container, able 
to carry 9,000 pounds (4,082 kg). It was 8 ft 6 in (2.59 m) long, 6 ft 3 in (1.91 m) wide, and 6 ft 10 in (2.08 m) high, 
with double doors on one end, was mounted on skids, and had lifting rings on the top four corners. After proving 
successful in Korea, the Transporter was developed into the Container Express (CONEX) box system in late 1952. 





battle plan in one blast to the Commander for action. This optimum battle plan to deliver maximum 
lethality in a combined strike – integrating Tomahawks on surface platforms, drones preposition in the 
AOR on the seabed, in the water column, on the surface, and in the air – concludes the information war! 
Upon Commander approval, the battle plans would be forwarded to assets in theater for execution.  
6. Undeveloped Concepts 
As requested by workshop leadership, Team Grindylow submitted the following list of concepts 
generated during their divergent work, but not developed: 
• DNA trail for attribution. Use by Special Operations Command (SOCOM) or ground locations? 
• Jefferson Starship – high-power microwave (HPM) equipped UAVs or UXVs  
• Pipe Rider - rail on underwater cable; checks for hacks / threats / UUV 
• Proa-type - indigenous, low cost sailing drones.  Provide components in form of kits (easy to 
assemble) that friendly, local populations would use to disrupt enemy forces. Kits would be easy 
to deploy (via air, surface, etc)  
• Det-Ruptor - multi- modal UxV (UAV to UUV, for instance) to locate / identify / report / disrupt 
enemy sensors or weapons in localized area of interest using electromagnetic pulse (EMP) 
• Fuzz Buster - HF disruption device which knocks or washes out communications for "fishing" / 
small vessels 
• Sea FART – utilizing underwater methane deposits to sink enemy ships 
• Flipper – rotary launcher for torpedo tube with miniaturized explosively-pumped EMP missiles. 
• Glider Mines – smart, mobile sea mines utilizing existing water glider propulsion to transit to 
littoral choke points 
D. Team Kraken  
 
Figure 21. Members of Team Kraken included (pictured from left to right) Lance Lowenberg, George Hwang, Jay Melillo, LT 
Bryce Christensen USN, Maj Clayton Schuety USAF, LT Todd Coursey USN, LT Joseph Hanacek USN, and Michael Graves (not 






The members of this team (see Figure 21 and Table 4) included five junior and mid-level officers from 
both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force, four visiting engineers, and four NPS students. 
Table 4. Members of Team Kraken (alphabetical by last name) 
NAME PERSPECTIVE AFFILIATION 
LT Bryce Christensen USN Naval aviation (rotary) NPS Business School 
LT Todd Coursey USN Facilitator  NPS Physics 
Michael Graves Electrical engineer JHU/APL 
LT Joseph Hanacek USN Surface warfare NPS Systems Engineering Analysis 
George Hwang Autonomy engineer NAWCAD/NAVAIR Pax River 
Lance Lowenberg Robotics engineer SSC-PAC 
Jay Melillo Engineering management NUWC Newport 
Maj Clayton Schuety USAF Air warfare NPS Defense Analysis 
LT Meghan Wilkens USN Facilitator USFF 
 
Computational power has been increasing at an extraordinary rate and has been for quite some time. 
Moore’s Law20 holds that computational power will double every 18 months to two years. Although 
popularized in the 1970s, this axiom has held true since the early days of mechanical switches and 
vacuum tubes through to today’s silicon wafer based nano-transistors. As the team looked to 2030, they 
did not assume only slightly better technology as that is not what happened in the past – they anticipate 
exponential advances in technology, and started their ideation with that assumption. 
 
Figure 22. OpenAI Five playing the best OpenAI employee team, 2018.21 
Based on the initial assumption of exponential technological advances, they also assumed a tremendous 
capability to analyze massive amounts of data will be a near future state. In experimentation with 
                                                          
20 Moore’s Law is a computing term which originated around 1970; the simplified version of this law states that 
processor speeds, or overall processing power for computers will double every two years. Source: 
http://www.mooreslaw.org/ last accessed 19 October 2018. 





AlphaGo Zero22 and OpenAI Five23, AI was able to train an algorithm to beat the best Dota players. Team 
Kraken titled their overall concept BATTLE-SIM, a computational simulation and modeling of the 
battlespace. Predictive machine learning algorithms can simulate possible outcomes and effects based 
on world conditions in order to guide strategic policy. Given the right initial conditions, using a strategic 
planning algorithm AI will be able to effectively predict the strategic outcome of an entire battle 
scenario. However, they cautioned that a simulation is only as good as its initial conditions. A robust and 
useful output is directly correlated to the quality of inputs. 
“We think this is how to win, but how do we get the data to build the right initial conditions?” 
With good data – geography, weather, friendly and enemy assets – and then a clever algorithm will be 
able to predict each move, and the outcome of each move throughout a full battle scenario. In the 
future we will need field sensors to provide reliable data to develop high-fidelity simulations. Team 
Kraken proposed three new concepts to generate the data needed for BATTLE-SIM to be effective: 
1) FellyFish: biomimetic jelly field sensors 
2) SmellyJelly: decentralized swarm control using digital phermones 
3) ThirdEye: human and environmental data tagging  
 A high fidelity simulation will give decision makers what they need to be successful. To build the right 
simulator requires the right inputs. “To get good sim you need good data.” Working backwards from 
that ideal data set the team proposed a three step query: What will it take to get that in real time; what 
do we need to do in the interim to get us the data in the field when we need it; and what can we start 
doing today? We need a swarming collection of intelligence gathering assets.  In order to get to this 
point by 2030, we need to start providing training and tagging data now for that level of technology we 
will need. 
1. FellyFish Fiber Sensors 
Producing an accurate simulation requires a robust data set. This requires robust sensing. Fiber optics is 
an offset technology and is primarily used for communications; however, fiber optics could also be used 
for sensing. If you make changes in the fiber structure you get a reflective wave length called a frag 
wave length. So anything that changes that microstructure and gives you a reflective wave length will 
give you a sensing element (see Figure 23). With fiber optics, you could sense temperature, strain, 
pressure, sound waves, and even magnetic anomalies. A fiber about the size of a human hair has 
multiplexing capabilities.  You could have multiple fibers depending on how many microstructures you 
                                                          
22 AlphaGo Zero is the latest evolution of AlphaGo, the first computer program to defeat a world champion at the 
ancient Chinese game of Go. Zero is even more powerful and is arguably the strongest Go player in history. Source: 
https://deepmind.com/blog/alphago-zero-learning-scratch/ last accessed 19 October 2018. 
23 Our team of five neural networks, OpenAI Five, has started to defeat amateur human teams at Dota 2. […] 
OpenAI Five plays 180 years worth of games against itself every day, learning via self-play. It trains using a scaled-
up version of Proximal Policy Optimization running on 256 GPUs and 128,000 CPU cores […]. Source: 





make. For instance, a ten-foot fiber could provide you hundreds of sensing elements, and all of these 
sensing elements could sense different things all along the same length of fiber.  
 
Figure 23. The principle of operation for a single AFO-SHM sensing node.24 
The team proposed operationalizing these lengths of fiber optic sensing cables as swarms of biomimetic 
jellies UUVs with fiber optic “tentacles” (see Figure 24) with multi sensor capabilities such as acoustic, 
electromagnetic, and thermal. These FellyFish might sense a submarine or UUV by picking up a magnetic 
anomaly or acoustic signature. The fiber optic sensor may also pick up a change in pressure as 
something moves through the water column. Using machine learning we might also train these systems 
to hear specific harmonic or acoustic sounds in the water. 
 
Figure 24. FellyFish concept would use jelly biomimicry replacing a jelly's tentacles with fiber optics. 
                                                          
24 Photo source: Physics.org https://phys.org/news/2016-09-fiber-optic-harsh-environments.html Credit: Optics 





Saturating the battlefield with sensors will provide the most ideal data set for the most accurate 
simulation. However, this saturation presents challenges such as asset mobility, control, 
communications, data export, and persistence. 
2. SmellyJelly Decentralized Swarm Control 
In order to collect the required data will require some sort of algorithm that works with UxVs in multiple 
domains operating in a swarm, which the team defined as 1,000 or more cheap and simple vehicles 
acting synergistically to achieve a collective objective. Collecting required data and achieving required 
level of autonomy simultaneously may require a tradeoff in computational capability. There are heavy 
computational costs required to centralize swarm operations. The team proposed “souping up” 
inexpensive UAVs to maximize their data collection capabilities, and address command and control 
through simple digital means. To minimize the amount of autonomy required to maximize data 
collection the team proposed digital pheromones, titling their concept SmellyJelly.   
 
Figure 25. Digital pheromones conveying a common operating picture (COP) to UxVs in multiple domain on an ISR mission.25 
Digital pheromones are low power signals, or other digital or physical signature, that allow us to convey 
very simple behavioral instructions to drive a swarm’s search characteristics in a contested environment. 
Pheromones build individual agent’s COP and then relayed to other vehicles in a mesh network building 
the whole picture. Instead of collecting data, pheromones would incorporate grid space and operational 
environments, localizing communication amongst the swarm. If a swarm of cross-domain UxVs are 
tasked with an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission, multiple vehicles may 
identify targets and will convey that information to the rest of the mission assets using digital 
pheromones appearing in the form of  heat map (see Figure 25) creating the full network COP.  Based on 
this simple information transfer, multiple assets will converge on the areas of interest. Harnessing 
                                                          






emergent behavior from simple interactions will minimize computational power required for 
autonomous operations, maximizing data collection capability. 
Although the localized communication of this digital pheromone swarm is harder to jam or deny, 
communication challenges are still present. Other challenges include deconfliction and self-organizing. 
3. ThirdEye EEG/EMG Bio Sleeve 
There is a need for good data – data that has been tagged and processed, that is then useful to feed into 
machine learning algorithms or combat simulators. Using human operators teamed with machines to 
collect this data in a new way, the team proposed ThirdEye. What if we could have real time tagging of 
incoming data as the operator sees or experiences it? 
The ThirdEye is a human to machine interface that allows the user to tag images using subvocal 
communication technology. By just looking at an object, or even just thinking about environmental 
elements present, an operator could quickly create a sharable COP (see Figure 26). Taking the burden off 
the operator, ThirdEye contributes to data collection to help train strategic wartime simulations. 
 
Figure 26. ThirdEye graphical user interface (GUI). 
Imagine soldiers out on patrol with ThirdEye technology integrated into their helmets and gear. Tracking 
the human operator eye movements, ThirdEye would be able to correlate the operator eye movements 
with the element of interest in their surroundings. Coupled with a technology developed by NASA 
enabling subvocal communication,26 ThirdEye would be able to read the neural impulses sent to the 
operator’s voicebox to receive commands without vocal input. All this tagged data would then be 
autonomously fed into the battle simulator to create a real time COP. 
                                                          
26 NASA subvocal speech demo (2004): 





To manage the amount of data the human-in-the loop needs to process and avoid cognitive overload, 
biometric data could be used to train an algorithm to filter relevant data to the human in the human-
autonomy team. Leveraging persistent and cumulative biometric monitoring (see Figure 27) using 
electroencephalogram (EEG) inputs and electromyography (EMG) ThirdEye would allow the network to 
supportively respond to the condition of the human operator. The biometric feedback to the system will 
allow ThirdEye to detect operator information saturation so the network will optimize the presentation 
of the required COP information, or task the UxV partner to operate at a higher level of autonomy 
allowing the human operator to focus on other tasks until conditions change. This scalable autonomy 
based on operator or mission conditions will ensure the machine team elements are a continuous asset 
to the unit. 
 
Figure 27. Persistent biometric monitoring of human operators.27 
ThirdEye promotes human-machine teaming through a cooperative interface.  The operator would be 
able to identify threats, and based simply on cerebral inputs, such as eye movements, the autonomous 
machine team member – such as a UAV – would be familiar enough with the individual pilot (see Figure 
27) to investigate and, if warranted, prosecute the threat and provide more data to the user.  Like 
J.A.R.V.I.S in Iron Man28 or Siri29 on steroids – ThirdEye is a system that would be able to interact with 
the human and actually have a conversation.  If, in training environments, the human team member 
presents a set of standard bio inputs this profile would then be used by the machine team member as a 
standard profile in future missions. If the human presents alternate inputs, the UxV team member 
                                                          
27 Pulling heavy G-forces can cause a pilot or astronaut to black out. A biometric sensor could monitor heart rate 
and other indicators to give a warning when he or she hits a danger zone. “Biometric Sensors Optimize Workouts” 
NASA Spinoff. Source: https://spinoff.nasa.gov/Spinoff2018/hm_2.html last accessed 24 October 2018. 
28 J.A.R.V.I.S. (Just A Rather Very Intelligent System), is Tony Stark's artificially intelligent computer. It is 
programmed to speak with a male voice in a British accent. Source: http://marvel-
movies.wikia.com/wiki/J.A.R.V.I.S. last accessed 20 October 2018 
29 Siri (pronounced /ˈsɪəri/ SEER-ee) is a built-in, voice-controlled personal assistant available for Apple users. The 
idea is that you talk to her as you would a friend and she aims to help you get things done, whether that be making 
a dinner reservation or sending a message. Source: https://www.pocket-lint.com/apps/news/apple/112346-what-





would be able to identify this behavior and assist the human to mitigate their stress to bring them back 
to the operational environment and threats at hand. 
4. BATTLE-SIM CONOPS 
 
Figure 28. Team Kraken BATTLE-SIM CONOPS in three phases. 
Team Kraken then presented a BATTLE-SIM CONOPS in the South China Sea structured in three phases:  
1) observation and reconnaissance 
2) collection and orientation 
3) decide and act  
Due to threats to human life at the start of any potential conflict, allied ships in the AOR will likely get 
pushed out of the South China Sea.  Employment of technology and UxVs in multiple domains enable us 
to take precautions to protect human life and still present and active forward presence and 
engagement.  Prior to their departure for the AOR, ships would be required to maintain a myriad of 
unmanned assets on board in the event of conflict.  These UxVs would use systems, information, and 
data already preloaded to autonomously execute missions such as: insert themselves into enemy 
territory, hide amongst shoals and reefs to gather copious amounts of data, and work amongst one 
another to coordinate and send data back to the ships and other personnel.  This minimizes human 





Observation and Reconnaissance  
 
Figure 29. BATTLE-SIM CONOPS OV-1 observation and reconnaissance. 
To address the first of the four phases of the OODA loop,30 phase one of the BATTLE-SIM CONOPS is 
observation and reconnaissance. BATTLE-SIM integrates artificial or unmanned intelligence for 
reconnaissance, minimizing the risk to human lives. By 2025 all ships will be required to have ample UxV 
equipment on board and be ready to offload these assets overboard at a moment’s notice and then 
egress the high risk areas. At the start of a conflict, units forward deployed in the AOR would deploy a 
massive swarm of UxV assets (see Figure 29) with fiber sensors and use digital pheromones to quickly 
build a COP.  Using existing high-voltage direct current (HVDC) lines,31 the UxV swarm would 
autonomously develop war tactics, recommend courses of action (COAs), and determine their own 
efficient locations in water to hide and operate to remain safe for prolonged usefulness. 
                                                          
30 Observe, orient, decide, act 
31 HVDC (high-voltage direct current) is a highly efficient alternative for transmitting large amounts of electricity 
over long distances and for special purpose applications. As a key enabler in the future energy system based on 
renewables, HVDC is truly shaping the grid of the future. Source: https://new.abb.com/systems/hvdc last accessed 





Collect and Orient 
 
Figure 30. BATTLE-SIM CONOPS OV-1 collect and orient. 
Not only will a large swarm of UxVs meet the data collection need for BATTLE-SIM, but flooding the 
South China Sea with biomimetic swarms of jellyfish-like autonomous vehicles (see Figure 30) would 
overwhelm the enemy. Drawing focus to the unmanned systems within their territory would force the 
enemy to redirect resources to investigate and drawing their attention away from other allied force 
activity and movement.  This may also force a prolonged conflict and starve the enemy of resources and 
any potential advantage in battle they may have previously established.  Data fed back to BATTLE-SIM 
for analysis would result in multiple possible COAs, some of which would come at the recommendation 





Decide and Act 
 
Figure 31. BATTLE-SIM CONOPS OV-1 decide and act phase. 
With loss of human life minimized, leadership will chose a BATTLE-SIM developed and recommended 
COA, and send physical assets and personnel to coordinate with the UxV swarm to conduct offensives 
(see Figure 31). Employing human systems integration through persistent biometric EEG/EMG bio sleeve 
feeds (see Figure 32) in coordination with the autonomous UxV swarm, the AOR command would act – 
moving human assets such as ships, submarines, and aircraft to strategic points in the AOR for the next 






Figure 32. Flight demonstration using EMG Bio-sleeve.32 
5. Undeveloped Concepts 
The following are the runner up technologies that would also be required or would contribute 
significantly towards aiding US forces in a 7th fleet conflict in 2030. 
Tag as You Go 
On the same page as the ThirdEye data collection process in order to supplement better AI, there is no 
need to wait for high tech solutions to data collection. In fact, even with those systems in place, without 
the right human efforts to build the formation of data collection, a tool like ThirdEye would only be of 
limited use. In the meantime, the DoD could implement simpler software solutions that would allow 
watchstanders to “tag” sensor video and audio data either while they are on watch or in after action 
“tape sessions.” In much the same way that a football team will get together and watch post-game 
video of themselves and other teams to identify strengths, weaknesses, and other important inputs, 
DoD personnel should be conducting similar evolutions to build up a database of potentially important 
information so that when AI collection systems begin to come on line, they already have a database 
from which to work with and build upon. 
                                                          
32 NASA Ames Technology Capabilities and Facilities, Extension of the Human Senses: This research group 
specializes in developing alternative methods for human-machine interaction as applied to device control and 
human performance augmentation. Source: https://www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/research/technology-





FSO Communications Network for Denied Environments 
 
Figure 33. UAV “Airship” used for free space optical (FSO) communications.33 
Long duration UAV swarm concept, perhaps leveraging hybrid airship (see Figure 33), employs a ship, 
USV, UUV, or shore station-launched network of strategically placed UAVs to provide medium range free 
space optical (FSO) communications in a conventional communications-denied environment. This 
technique might be considered in conjunction with improved blue laser communications. 
HVDC Island Connecter 
 
Figure 34. HVDC Island Connector concept. 
The team considered an HVDC power line connecting island islands (see Figure 34) from South Korea to 
Singapore, providing charging stations for UXVs and other assets defending the allied island chains. The 
team also considered deploying fiber sensors on biomimetic jellyfish UxVs to augment this concept (see 
Figure 35). 
 
                                                          
33 Eric Adams “Lockheed’s Hybrid Airship Is Part Blimp, Part Hovercraft, No Hot Air” WIRED 7 October 2016. Source: 







Figure 35. Biomimetic jelly UxVs with fiber sensors deployed to augment HVDC Island Connector concept. 
 
E. Team Hydra 
 
Figure 36. Members of Team Hydra included (pictured from left to right)  LT Jonathan Formanek USN, Dr. Brian Reitz, Dr. 
Andrew Schicho, LT Kristen Ainslie USN, Dr. Michael Ouimet, LCDR Brian Newgren USN, CDR Santiago Carrizosa USNR, Ann 
Gallenson, and Travis Aion. 
 
The members of this team (see Figure 36 and Table 5) included four junior and mid-level officers from 
the U.S. Navy, four visiting engineers, one U.S. Navy reservist, one NPS faculty member, and three NPS 
students. 
Table 5. Members of Team Hydra (alphabetical by last name) 
NAME PERSPECTIVE AFFILIATION 
LT Kristen Ainsle USN Submarine warfare NPS Undersea Warfare 
Travis Aion Facilitator  TANG JHU/APL 
CDR Santiago Carrizosa USNR Oceanography ONR 
LT Jonathan Formanek USN Surface warfare NPS 





LCDR Brian Newgren USN Air warfare NPS Systems Engineering Analysis 
Dr. Michael Ouimet Aerospace engineer SSC-PAC 
Dr. Brian Reitz Research engineer NAVAIR China Lake 
Dr. Andrew Schicho Mechanical engineer NSWC Panama City 
 
From the scenario, Team Hydra focused on the South China Sea. China has invaded and occupied a 
sovereign nation, and allied forces are trying to enter that conflict zone and remove the occupying 
forces. By 2032 the team assumed that the entire South China Sea region will be “rich and dense with 
lots of smart networks” and unmanned systems in multiple domains – air, surface, and subsurface.  
After an assumed two-year absence from the region, the team envisioned that allied forces will be 
operating in a global positioning system (GPS) and SATCOM denied environment. Battery technology will 
continue to improve providing a longer life and higher power level at a lower cost available to all future 
UxVs. 
Narrowing their design challenge to the question How might we defeat a network of adversary 
unmanned systems? They proposed a solution in three phases: interrogate enemy UxVs in order to gain 
access to the enemy OODA loop34 through observation, and then exploit the enemy network. They 
named their concept Hydra IOeX. “By interrogating, observing and finally exploiting that knowledge we 
will gain control of and defeat the enemy network of unmanned systems.” 
1. Interrogate 
Assuming a future conflict will rely on UxVs countering UxVs in all available domains, a traditional war of 
attrition35 will not work.  The adversary has “home field advantage” with manned and unmanned assets 
available in all domains close to their mainland industrial base, and shorter supply lines for logistics. If 
we go one to one against their unmanned systems we will lose that fight. How do we use our swarms of 
UxVs to defeat their systems? Team Hydra proposed that the best way to defeat the adversary’s UxVs 
was to learn how their systems operate, and then predict how our adversary may use these assets. 
Armed with this knowledge, allied forces will then be able to exploit their systems to our advantage. 
                                                          
34   The cycle of “observe, orient, decide, and act” developed by military strategist and United States Air Force 
Colonel John Boyd. 
35 A struggle in which you harm your opponent in many small ways, so that they become gradually weaker. Source: 
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/war-of-attrition last 






Figure 37. Aerial example of interrogation and observation phases of Hydra IOeX using low-cost UAVs to charge an enemy 
asset. 
The first phase of Hydra IOeX is interrogation – using our UxSs to elicit a response to gain intelligence. 
For instance, a massive swarm – hundreds up to 1,000 – of low-cost UAVs (see Figure 37) might perform 
a series of actions to instigate an enemy response. Using very simple programming and without satellite 
communications, this aerial swarm could charge an enemy asset (see Figure 37) to see how it responds, 
then retreat and observe the enemy response. Does the response change if charged with intent to 
attack? What if the UAV swarm approaches an island or ship that the enemy asset is loitering near? 
Does this elicit a response? How close does our asset need to be to elicit a response? What kind of 
response? Will it retreat, follow, or attack? There are thousands of actions we could take to elicit many 
more potential responses in all domains. The knowledge gained from these interactions will enable 
more effective exploitation in the third phase.  
2. Observe – Bio Buoys 
The next phase of Hydra IOeX is the observation phase, the team proposed a biological buoy with 
embedded sensors. Like the trash cover proposed by Team Grindylow (see Appendix A:C:4 page 31) the 
biological buoy would use biomimicry as camouflage, such as a buoy designed to look like kelp (see 






Figure 38. Biological buoy with embedded sensors designed to look like kelp. 
Designed to expand out and down when it comes in contact with the water, this kelp buoy could be 
deployed in a pill form by a maritime patrol aircraft such as a P-8 (see Figure 39).  
 
Figure 39. P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.36 
Once deployed in the AOR, the biological buoy would provide persistent passive observation of enemy 
behavior using systems hiding in plain sight or onboard complex UxVs surrounded by low cost decoys. As 
a passive receive sensor, the kelp buoy would remain dormant until triggered by nearby activity. Once 
triggered, the biological buoy would collect data until cued to transmit the collected data – potentially 
through a network of these passive biological buoys. Working in tandem with other UxVs in the AOR to 
complete hunter-killer37 type maneuvers, these buoys could help control the AOR undersea space. 
3. Exploit – Algorithm Capture 
One of the ways we could exploit is not by actually physically capturing an asset, but by understanding 
the predictability that are inherent in algorithms. Presuming that all drones of a certain class run the 
same software, one stimulus will elicit the same response in an entire class of UxVs programmed with 
                                                          
36 J. Keller (2014) “Boeing to equip Navy's new P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft for high-altitude ASW 
missions” December 15, 2014. Military Aerospace Electronics. Source: 
https://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2014/12/p8-high-altitude.html last accessed 22 October 2018 
37 denoting a type of naval vessel, esp a submarine, designed and equipped to pursue and destroy enemy craft. 





the same algorithm. We need to have good data about the enemy. Once we understand how enemy 
assets respond to a certain set of conditions or a certain stimulus will help us more effectively predict 
how the enemy will respond to planned or proposed actions. 
Although in the future we might employ machine learning or reinforcement learning, but we might also 
do this in more simple ways. For instance, if we know that in response to certain actions the enemy 
assets in an area will respond by giving chase we may use that knowledge to our advantage by 
provoking an enemy patrol to give chase and then sending a second wave of assets through the 
unpatrolled area left behind. If we emit certain signals it might provoke enemy assets to transmit 
reports over and over again resulting in drained batteries or clogged communications channels, 
minimizing adversary bandwidth. If the enemy UxVs are programmed return to a charging station when 
drained we could then follow enemy UxVs to their forward deployed energy and communications 
outpost (FDECO) nodes, tagging enemy seabed infrastructure for prosecution, lay in wait to capture 
enemy assets, leveraging their FDECO nodes to recharge our assets or replace their FDECO node with 
one of our own. 
4. Exploit – Physical Capture 
Once we have access to the adversary’s network, we could use their network to gather intelligence, or 
disrupt their network through jamming communications, hacking, or spreading disinformation to disrupt 
enemy operations. Capturing physical UxV assets might be another effective tactic to gain this access. 
Analysis of captured software will expose algorithms, but capture of hardware could be effective as well. 
The enemy will likely have deployed hundreds, if not thousands of UxVs in their AOR operating under 
one large network or several disparate networks.  
 
Figure 40. Net dragged from a helicopter to capture enemy hardware deployed in the AOR. 
Using learned adversary behavior to our advantage to capture enemy hardware, if we collect a sample 
UxV asset we could take it apart for analysis. One proposed method to collect an enemy UUV or USV is 





through analysis of their hardware, but we could also reassemble and release their asset with an 
alteration – maybe one small replaced or removed part – to render it useless. 
5. Hydra IOeX Quick Response Team Module 
Interrogating, observing and physically capturing either UxV assets or their algorithms will give allied 
forces and advantage in the enemy home field. The final element of Hydra IOeX is a mobile unit of 
analysts ready to respond (see Figure 41). 
 
Figure 41. Hydro IOeX quick reaction team deployment suggestion.38 
The Hydra IOeX quick response team is a highly trained quick reaction team deployed to take apart and 
hack enemy networks. Through analysis of captured software or hardware, the quick response team will 
provide commanders the information necessary for mission success. Through examination of captured 
hardware and software, the analysts will determine how the vehicles are operating, identify key 
hardware and algorithms, and expose their communications protocols. “What are things we could 
potentially take advantage of?” As enemy assets are intercepted and collected we will note the location 
to determine where higher densities of enemy assets might be operating as this may indicate where 
deployed charging is taking place, or other centralized hubs or vulnerabilities. 
                                                          
38 Graphic source: https://shippingcontainers.net/conex-shipping-containers.html combined with 





F. Team Loch Ness  
 
Figure 42. Members of Team Loch Ness included (pictured from left to right) Brett Vaughan, Maj Stephen Maddox USAF, 
Daniel Eby, LT Aaron Antonio USN, Erik Hanssen, LT Dolph Eich USN, and Andrea Leichtman (not pictured, Dr. Misha 
Blocksome). 
 
The members of this team (see Figure 42 and Table 6) included three junior officers from both the U. 
S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force, three early career engineers, one representative from the Pentagon, a 
Naval War College faculty member, and two NPS students. 
Table 6. Members of Team Loch Ness (alphabetical by last name) 
NAME PERSPECTIVE AFFILIATION 
LT Aaron Antonio USN Surface warfare NPS Systems Engineering Analysis 
Dr. Misha Blocksome Irregular warfare Naval War College 
Daniel Eby Mechanical engineer JHU/APL 
LT Dolph Eich USN Surface warfare NPS Systems Engineering Analysis 
Erik Hanssen Electrical engineer LMCO 
Andrea Leichtman Facilitator  JHU/APL 
Maj Stephen Maddox USAF Air warfare 12th Flying Training Wing 
Brett Vaughan Facilitator  OPNAV N2N6FX 
 
Team Loch Ness worked the design challenge at the classified level, although their plenary injects of 
data was unclassified with the rest of the participants.  The two concepts they generated were: 
1. Bathymetric Explorer for Neutralizing and Disrupting Enemy Resources (BENDER) 
2. Submarine Investigation, Revelation, and Exploitation Network (SIREN) 
These concepts were presented in the classified space and full details are available through appropriate 






APPENDIX B: Scenario 
Developed by retired Navy Captain and Professor of Practice in the NPS Operations Research 
Department Jeff Kline, the following scenario was the environment given for the design challenge: 
Global War of 2030 
A fictional scenario to support academic work 
 
2030 Political, Social, and Economic narrative:  
Although China’s economic growth began to slow in 2018, she continued her political, fiscal, economic, 
and military expansionism. In 2030 China is the world’s first economy, has a large and growing middle 
class population and consequently generates a higher demand for oil and natural gas. Relationships 
between Russia and China are thriving, underwritten by a strong energy trade and common desire to 
challenge the United States national power. China depends on the Trans-Siberian pipeline developed after 
negotiations with Russia on oil purchases were signed in 2014. Further economic ties were generated by 
a series of trade agreements that began in 2020. 
 
In 2030, Russia’s economy is stabilized by Europe’s and China’s consistent demand for her oil. They have 
the fifth largest GDP and are beginning to address internal social challenges. They have maintained control 
of Crimea, retain forces on the Ukraine-Russian border, have modernized their missile program, execute 
annual military exercises on the borders of neighboring Baltic countries, and have built a modern 
submarine fleet. President Putin’s successor continues the rhetoric of a greater Russia through 
exploitation of opportunities provided by a warming Arctic, and reclaiming traditional Russian lands. Since 
the agreement signed in 2017 between Russia and Syria to allow Russian expansion, sovereignty and use 
of the naval facility at Tartus, Russia formed a permanent naval group and improved the facilities to 
homeport 11 ships there. They also retain their use of the Syrian Hmeymim airbase. With extensive aid 
from Russia, Syria was able to rebuild their land and air forces.  
 
Turkey continued distancing from its NATO allies as more Islamic politicians were elected to leadership. 
By 2025 Turkey was a member of NATO in name only, and requested all NATO forces leave its territory. 
As a result, by 2027 no U.S. Forces were based in Turkey.  
 
Since 2015 the increased economic and social ties between mainland China and Taiwan, combined with 
an economically (yet not necessary democratically) more liberal Chinese central government, resulted in 
a 2027 non-aggression treaty between the two states with agreements to begin discussions on unification. 
By 2030, although not yet under “one government”, the Taiwan parliament has Communist party 
representation and the joint government, military and economic initiatives between China and Taiwan 
have grown to the point they are a de-facto Chinese economic and military federation. For example, 
Taiwan has allowed China to build High Frequency Surface Wave radar stations and passive collection 
systems on Taiwan with joint intelligence sharing responsibilities. Taiwan no longer relies on military sales 
from the United States.  
 
China populated several islands terra-formed through dredging in 2015 with military installations. For 
example, Fiery Cross Reef has a squadron of J-20s (fifth generation plus) with 10 Dark Sword UCAVs, while 
Fiery Reef, Mischief Reef, Gaven Reef, and Hughes Reefs have surface to air installations (S-500), anti- 





ship support facilities. China is now building facilities on terra-formed islands made from the western end 
of the Scarborough Shoal reef, protested by the Philippines and the United States.  
 
Tensions have eased somewhat on the Korean Peninsula after North Korea’s participation in the 2018 
Olympics and follow-on leadership summits. However, North Korea continues developing greater ballistic 
missile and cruise missile capabilities. The successful submarine launched ballistic missile in 2017 was 
followed by a series of failures, then successes of both land launched and sea launched ballistic missiles 
and well as shore to ship cruise missiles. 
 
Japan and the United States have strengthened their social, economic, and military ties in response to 
the growing influence of both China and Russia. The Yokosuka naval facility has evolved to a joint JMSDF 
and United States Navy base with GEORGE WASHINGTON and its air wing, three United States DDGs, eight 
United States LCSs, and the Japanese fleet sharing the installation. In Sasebo, the United States Navy 
retains LHA-6, LPD-25 and LSD-52 and two LCS for mine clearance and protection.  
The United States also established closer ties to Singapore, stationing eight LCSs, a squadron of P-8s and 
their shore support in the city-nation. In addition, the United States now maintains logistic support bases 
in Diego Garcia and pre-positioned expeditionary supplies in Subic, with joint agreements with the U.K. 
and Philippines respectively. These bases can act as “rapid build-up” support bases if the host country 
agrees. Additionally, the Philippines have invited the United States Air Force to use Clark AFB as an 
expeditionary field, expanding its role beyond joint training exercises. The United States Air Force has 
retained Kadena AFB on Okinawa, and III MEF completed its move from Futenma to the newly constructed 
land-fill air base in Henoko village. In addition, a battalion landing team is stationed in Darwin, Australia.  
 
Australia has executed the programs envisioned in their 2015 defense white paper and built up their air 
and naval forces with the intent of closer cooperation with the United States. For example, 8 of a planned 
12 Shortfin Barracuda SSKs are now operational and the RAAF operates 15 P-8 and 7 MQ-4C Triton from 
Edinburgh conducting frequent bi-lateral exercises with the United States.  
 
Central and Eastern Mediterranean  
In late 2029, Israel launched extensive air and cruise missile attacks into southern Syria in response to 
month-long attacks into the Golan Heights by rockets, swarming aerial vehicles, and explosive unmanned 
ground vehicles traveling through the southern end of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Forces. A 
combination of Hamas, Iran Revolutionary Guard, and Syrian forces were the sources of these attacks, 
and Israel’s responses hit military installations and supply depots from all these organizations. Several 
Israel aircraft and cruise missiles were shot down by surface to air missile sites believed to be manned by 
Russian “civilian” advisors.  
 
Within days Palestinian riots occurred throughout the West Bank and Gaza creating a new Intifada. Israel 
declared martial law, called up their reserves, and put their forces on the Golan Heights in high alert. With 
its allies, Syria amassed forces along the Golan Heights threatening similar invasion paths as the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War, tying down Israeli armor, artillery, and infantry positions. Russian naval forces in Tartus 
sortied, the Hmeymim Russian air wing began continuous combat air patrols, and Russian air defense 
stations went on high alert. While this was occurring, the undersea “Quantum Cable” providing high speed 
digital connectivity into Israel went dead. 
 
The Syrian attack came a week later with massive swarming air vehicles, rockets, air launched missiles, 
cruise missiles, and unmanned ground vehicles along the Golan Heights border. Three divisions of Syrian 





Magshimim, rapidly bridging ravines and rivers. This, however, did not turn out to be the main effort. 
Syrian forces on the northern Golan Heights border swung northwest and traveled 20 miles through 
Lebanon to invade Israel on its northern border with Lebanon, and were joined by insurgents from that 
state. At the same time, approximately one hundred civilian boats carrying up to twenty light infantry 
each landed near Acre after traveling the 100 nautical miles from various ports in southern Syria and 
northern Lebanon. These forces were escorted one LSM and by 5 new Syrian missile ships (1,300 tons, 
308 feet long) purchased from the Russians known as Project 22160 featuring capabilities from long range 
Klub ship and land-attack missiles to helo support for ISR. These ships also carried special forces which 
landed with the other amphibious troops. In all, 2000 light fighters were placed on the beach near Acre.  
 
Israel now faced a three pronged attack on its northern border, and rockets attacks from insurgents in 
Gaza.  
 
South and East China Sea:  
In the spring of 2029, a Vietnamese fisher was rammed and sunk by a Chinese maritime security ship. The 
Chinese government justified the unfortunate action as an enthusiastic Captain defending China’s EEZ 
rights, although similar incidents have occurred over the past 20 years. Vietnam did not accept the 
rationale and vowed their fishing fleet, as well as their at sea drilling rigs, would henceforth be protected. 
Two weeks later a Chinese deep-sea exploration ship exploded without warning 100 nautical miles north 
of Natuna Besar. China claimed either Vietnam, Indonesia or the Philippines were responsible. They 
mobilized their South China Seas fleet and demanded restoration from all three countries or they would 
“secure” their sea. One month later the Chinese sank a patrolling Vietnamese ship using a land-based 
surface to surface missile launched from Woody Island (YJ-83) in the Paracels and moved a squadron of 
SU-37s to Woody Island. They announced all traffic through the South China Sea would henceforth be 
subject to inspection and control by Chinese forces. They threatened to assume governorship of the island 
of Natuna Besar Indonesia to control the South China Sea’s southern approaches and in compensation for 
the attack on their deep sea exploration ship. The 1st Marine Brigade at Zhanjiang, Guangdong has 
embarked in the South China fleet’s amphibious flotilla (13 landing ships modernized Type 71 LPDs and 
Type 72II LSTH). They can be underway in one day’s notice and intelligence indicates their objective is the 
occupation of Natuna Besar.  
 
During these events, a Philippine helicopter fired on a PLAN Type 56 corvette conducing gunnery exercises 
four miles from Palawan Island. In response, China also threatened invasion of Palawan. Increased activity 
by the PLA’s 124th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division in Guangzhou district indicates they may be 
readying for this operation. 
 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines have requested UN support, specifically calling on the United 
States and Japan to act. In response, China has warned Japan and the United States any interference with 
their enforcement policy will lead to war, with the threat of nuclear escalation. To show their resolve, 
China mobilized the East Sea and South Sea fleets and sailed at least 50 submarines from both fleets, 
including two SSGN on what are assessed to be strategic deterrence patrols. They have declared a 
quarantine on all military logistics support (including oil) to Okinawa and have set up ships in blocking 














APPENDIX C: Workshop Schedule 
The three and a half day workshop started on Monday morning with a series of knowledge leveling 
briefs, followed by initial team meetings. Both Tuesday and Wednesday started with full group technical 
inject sessions followed by a full day of team generation work. Teams presented their final concepts on 
Thursday morning and the workshop adjourned by noon to accommodate outgoing travel. 
MON – 17 September   
0745 Registration GLASGOW 109 
0800 Welcome VADM Ronald Route USN (ret), NPS 
President 
0815 CRUSER Overview Dr. Ray Buettner, NPS FX Director 
0835 NPS Warfare Innovation 
Continuum & Scenario 
CAPT Jeff Kline USN (ret), NPS Chair of 
Systems Engineering Analysis (SEA) 
0915 Cross Domain Operations  CDR Roy Wilson, USFFC N92 
0940 Achieving Emerging Technology Mr. Mike Tall, SSC-PAC 
1005 Undersea Infrastructure Defense Dr. David Alderson, NPS Operations 
Research 
1030 BREAK  
1040 FDECO  Mr. Jose Chavez, SSC-PAC 
1105 Seabed Topography Mr. George Zvara, NUWC Newport 
1130 Team Introductions  Ms. Lyla Englehorn, NPS CRUSER 
Associate Director 
1200 LUNCH  
1300 Tools of Design Ms. Lyla Englehorn, NPS CRUSER 
Associate Director 
1330 Industry Perspective Statement Mr. Glen Sears, LMCO 
1355 Seabed Cables Mr. Steven Powell, Trans Bay Cable 
1420 Tasking CAPT Jeff Kline USN (ret), NPS SEA Chair 
1500 Initial Team Meetings BREAKOUT ROOMS 
1600 Icebreaker TRIDENT ROOM 
 
TUES – 18 September 
  
GLASGOW 109 
0800 Welcome Dr. Brian Bingham, NPS CRUSER Director 
0810 Keynote Address – Crossing the 
Valley of Death 






0900 Innovation Challenges Dr. Maura Sullivan, FATHOM5 Founder & 
COO 
0925 Lessons Learned in Innovation Mr. Stephen O’Grady & Mr. Mark 
Dalton, NUWC Newport 
1000 Discovery Interviews – Mentors  BREAKOUT ROOMS – Mentors meet in 
GLASGOW 128 
1100 Concept Generation – Divergent BREAKOUT ROOMS 
1200 LUNCH  
1300 “Just One Thing” launch  – 
Mentors  
GLASGOW 128 
1300 Concept Generation – Divergent 
to Convergent  
WED – 19 September 
  
GLASGOW 109 
0800 Welcome Ms. Lyla Englehorn, NPS CRUSER 
Associate Director 
0810 MTX & SLAMR Dr. Raymond Buettner, NPS FX Director 
0835 On Undersea Infrastructure 
Defense 
Mr. William Glenney, Institute for Future 
Warfare Studies 
0900 Fielding Unmanned Systems in 
Multiple Domains 
CAPT George Galdorisi USN (ret), SSC-
PAC 
0930 Concept Generation – 
Convergent 
BREAKOUT ROOMS 
1000 NPS Lab Tour – Mentors Guided tour leaves from Starbucks 
1030 Directors & Chairs Rotation BREAKOUT ROOMS 
1200 LUNCH  
1300 Concept Development – Final 
Push 
BREAKOUT ROOMS 




THUR – 20 September 
  
GLASGOW 109 
0800 Team Photos & Evaluation  
0830 Final Briefs  
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